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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3327
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
democracy
elections
information markets
threshold contracts and triple mechanism
JEL: 
D72
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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