Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46366 
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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-01-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:17:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:17:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46366-
dc.description.abstractI develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient, short-term contracts can be worse due to hold-up problems. The optimal long-term contract is more ambitious if its length is relatively short and the technological spillover large. The optimal length increases in this externality. With renegotiation, the outcome is first best. The results have several implications for how to design a climate treaty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2962en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.jelF55en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddynamic private provision of public goodsen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic common pool problemsen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic hold-up problemsen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen
dc.subject.keywordcontract-lengthen
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiation designen
dc.subject.keywordclimate change and climate agreementsen
dc.titleThe dynamics of climate agreements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644949252en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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