Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46335
Authors: 
Kolmar, Martin
Rommeswinkel, Hendrik
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3362
Abstract: 
The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups. For groups with heterogenous valuations the complementarity of group members' efforts is shown to play a role as a further factor.
Subjects: 
contests
public goods
group-size paradox
JEL: 
D74
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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