Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46303 
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dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Nadineen
dc.contributor.authorSchildberg-Hörisch, Hannahen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:15:07Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:15:07Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46303-
dc.description.abstractWe use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3450en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelK40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnon-binding obligationsen
dc.subject.keywordexpressive lawen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleAsymmetric obligations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661604691en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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