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dc.contributor.authorVives, Xavieren
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-10-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:14:37Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:14:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46277-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3485en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD84en
dc.subject.jelG14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation acquisitionen
dc.subject.keyworddouble auctionen
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordrate of convergenceen
dc.subject.keywordbehavioural tradersen
dc.subject.keywordcomplementaritiesen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwRationale Erwartungen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwInformationsbeschaffungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA large-market rational expectations equilibrium model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661907937en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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