Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46142
Authors: 
Balafoutas, Loukas
Kocher, Martin G.
Putterman, Louis
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5204
Abstract: 
We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects eithervote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects' voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.
Subjects: 
equality
efficiency
voluntary contribution mechanism
incentives
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
D31
D68
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
355.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.