Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46056
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dc.contributor.authorAndersen, Torben M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSvarer, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-28T13:53:56Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-28T13:53:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46056-
dc.description.abstractThe consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between good and bad states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but there may also be an incentive argument. Since benefits may be less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that counter-cyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal (utilitarian) benefits are counter-cyclical and may reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5196en_US
dc.subject.jelJ6en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordunemployment benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbusiness cycleen_US
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturelle Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBusiness cycle dependent unemployment insuranceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659026295en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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