Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45737 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorDahlberg, Matzen
dc.contributor.authorLundqvist, Heléneen
dc.contributor.authorMörk, Evaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-22-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:29:23Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:29:23Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45737-
dc.description.abstractIn their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors run by the local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support the view that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants within municipalities to support own goals.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) |cUppsalaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2008:17en
dc.subject.jelC33en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH70en
dc.subject.jelH83en
dc.subject.jelJ45en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.keywordgrantsen
dc.subject.keywordbureaucratsen
dc.subject.keywordrent seekingen
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuity analysisen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwKommunalverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwAllokationen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen
dc.titleIntergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn577936433en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
660.1 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.