Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45731 
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dc.contributor.authorJohansson, Peren
dc.contributor.authorLindahl, Ericaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-27T09:29:17Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-27T09:29:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45731-
dc.description.abstractDuring the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social interactions for explaining sickness absence behavior. In this context public discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for reducing the sickness absence. In this paper we study whether information meetings about the Swedish sickness insurance affect the length of sickness absence spells. The study is based on experimental data on individuals with weak labor market attachments. The displacement of when the call to the meeting was sent out was randomized. Comparing the survival functions of those called immediately with those whose calls were delayed (by about 30 days) makes it possible to study whether the length of sickness absence is affected by receiving the call earlier. The result suggests that the length is reduced by, on average, 20 percent. In the long term (12 months later) there is no effect of the information meeting. This suggests that attendance to the information meeting does not change individuals' long-term behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) |cUppsalaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2010:11en
dc.subject.jelC93en
dc.subject.jelH51en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelJ22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordpublic social insuranceen
dc.subject.keywordsurvival analysisen
dc.subject.keywordinstrumental variablesen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkten
dc.subject.stwFehlzeiten
dc.subject.stwKrankheiten
dc.subject.stwKrankenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwSchwedenen
dc.titleCan sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638844622en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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