Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634
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dc.contributor.authorPuppe, Clemensen_US
dc.contributor.authorTasnádi, Attilaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-23T09:50:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-23T09:50:05Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:swb:90-229984en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45634-
dc.description.abstractIn a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the 'optimal gerrymandering rule'). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKIT [u.a.] |cKarlsruheen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series in economics |x24en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddistrictingen_US
dc.subject.keywordgerrymanderingen_US
dc.titleAxiomatic districtingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn657459097en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:24-

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