Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45441 
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dc.contributor.authorChen, Yingen
dc.contributor.authorEraslan, Hülyaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T09:34:49Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-09T09:34:49Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45441-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the ideological positions are publicly known, it may not be possible to have informative communication from the legislator who is ideologically distant from the proposer, but the more moderate legislator can communicate whether he would 'compromise' or 'fight' on ideology. If instead the private information pertains to the ideological positions, then all parties may convey whether they will 'cooperate', 'compromise', or 'fight' on ideology. When the uncertainty is about ideological intensity, the proposer is always better on making proposals for the two dimensions together despite separable preferences, but when the uncertainty is about ideological positions, bundling can result in informational loss which hurts the proposer.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum |cIstanbulen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x1021en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen
dc.subject.stwParlamenten
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638359406en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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