Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45426 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T09:34:33Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-09T09:34:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45426-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety are asymptotically Walrasian. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through a Bayesian mechanism proposal game. The paper considers a market in steady state. As discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all trade takes place at a Walrasian price. However, a robust example is presented where the limit price vector is a Walrasian price for an economy where only a strict subsets of the goods in the original economy are traded, i.e, markets are missing at the limit. Nevertheless, there exists a sequence of equilibria that converge to a Walrasian equilibria for the whole economy where all markets are open.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum |cIstanbulen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x1031en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMatching and Bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordSearchen
dc.subject.keywordFoundations for Perfect Competitionen
dc.subject.keywordTwo-sided Incomplete Informationen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.titleCompetitive equilibria in decentralized matching with incomplete information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638372836en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
386.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.