Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45426
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dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T09:34:33Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-09T09:34:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45426-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety are asymptotically Walrasian. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible good. Buyer preferences and endowments as well as seller costs are private information. Agents engage in costly search and meet randomly. The terms of trade are determined through a Bayesian mechanism proposal game. The paper considers a market in steady state. As discounting and the fixed cost of search become small, all trade takes place at a Walrasian price. However, a robust example is presented where the limit price vector is a Walrasian price for an economy where only a strict subsets of the goods in the original economy are traded, i.e, markets are missing at the limit. Nevertheless, there exists a sequence of equilibria that converge to a Walrasian equilibria for the whole economy where all markets are open.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum |cIstanbulen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum working paper series |x1031en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMatching and Bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordSearchen_US
dc.subject.keywordFoundations for Perfect Competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordTwo-sided Incomplete Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwMatchingen_US
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.titleCompetitive equilibria in decentralized matching with incomplete informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638372836en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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