Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/45415 
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dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-09T09:34:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-09T09:34:21Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/45415-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria are characterized as the values that satisfy the first order conditions for a non-linear planner's (optimization) problem, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of efficient search equilibria under complete information. These results fully generalize to the twosided incomplete information setting, under an additive separability condition.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum |cIstanbulen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x1030en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordSearchen
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen
dc.subject.keywordTwo-sided Incomplete Informationen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.titleEfficient dynamic matching with costly search-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn638372461en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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