Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45415
Authors: 
Atakan, Alp E.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum working paper series 1030
Abstract: 
This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria are characterized as the values that satisfy the first order conditions for a non-linear planner's (optimization) problem, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of efficient search equilibria under complete information. These results fully generalize to the twosided incomplete information setting, under an additive separability condition.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Search
Matching
Two-sided Incomplete Information
JEL: 
C73
C78
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
422.51 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.