Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44977
Authors: 
Buechel, Berno
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper series in economics 17
Abstract: 
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median alternative ('the median voter'). Based on this result, we propose two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof social choice rule on this domain.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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