Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44661 
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dc.contributor.authorLall, Ranjiten
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-08T09:06:18Z-
dc.date.available2011-04-08T09:06:18Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.isbn978-87-7605-395-6en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44661-
dc.description.abstractOne of the most significant casualties of the recent fi nancial crisis has been the Basel II Accord, a set of proposals to regulate the international banking system drawn up by a committee of G10 banking supervisors between 1999 and 2004. Whether or not they view Basel II as a direct contributor to the crisis, policymakers agree that the fundamental tenets of the accord have been decisively discredited by recent events. In this paper, I ask why Basel II's creators fell so short of their aim of improving the safety of the international banking system - that is, why Basel II failed. Drawing on recent work on global regulatory capture, I present a theoretical framework which emphasizes the importance of timing and sequencing in determining the outcome of rule-making in international fi nance. Th is framework helps to explain not only why Basel II failed, but also why the latest set of proposals to regulate the international banking system - the so-called 'Basel III' Accord - is likely to meet a similar fate.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDanish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) |cCopenhagenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIIS Working Paper |x2010:16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwBasel IIen
dc.subject.stwEigenkapitalvorschriftenen
dc.subject.stwBankenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleReforming global banking rules: Back to the future?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn630331618en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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