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dc.contributor.authorKauhanen, Anttien
dc.contributor.authorNapari, Samien
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:38:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:38:42Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aETLA Discussion Papers |x1216en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIncentive payen
dc.subject.keywordperformance measurementen
dc.subject.keywordrisk versus distortion trade-offen
dc.subject.keywordagency theoryen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwPerformance-Messungen
dc.subject.stwAngestellteen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.titlePerformance measurement and incentive plans-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn62731502Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rif:dpaper:1216en

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