Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44527 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ETLA Discussion Papers No. 1216
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.
Schlagwörter: 
Incentive pay
performance measurement
risk versus distortion trade-off
agency theory
JEL: 
J33
M52
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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