Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44455
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dc.contributor.authorKlein, Gordon J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-14T15:33:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-14T15:33:15Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44455-
dc.description.abstractLeniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a more direct measure of success, the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive effect on industries' competition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and effective deterrence.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-107en_US
dc.subject.jelC23en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCartelen_US
dc.subject.keywordAntitrusten_US
dc.subject.keywordLeniency Programen_US
dc.titleCartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidenceen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn645296945en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10107-

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