Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44450 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 11-010
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy.
Subjects: 
R&D collaboration
intellectual property
uncertainty
patents
JEL: 
O31
O38
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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