Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44432
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dc.contributor.authorde Carvalho Andrade, Eduardoen_US
dc.contributor.authorde Castro, Luciano I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-09T09:01:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-09T09:01:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44432-
dc.description.abstractA parallel of education with transformative processes in standard markets suggest that a more severe control of the quality of the output will improve the overall quality of the education. This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam difficulty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs, rather than increase exams' difficulties.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2011-2en_US
dc.subject.jelI2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordschool standardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignaling modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordcognitive skillsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-cognitive skillsen_US
dc.titleTougher educational exam leading to worse selectionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644788879en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20112-

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