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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Stühmeier, Torben | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-02-18T16:13:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-02-18T16:13:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Typically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInternational Telecommunications Society (ITS) |cCalgary | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |a21st European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Telecommunications at New Crossroads: Changing Value Configurations, User Roles, and Regulation", Copenhagen, Denmark, 13th-15th September 2010 |x34 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L96 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Termination charges | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Interconnection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Regulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Price Discrimination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) | en |
dc.title | Fixed to VoIP Interconnection: Regulation with Asymmetric Termination Costs | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 654502390 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:itse10:34 | en |
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