Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 424
This article proves a very general version of the Kirman-Sondermann [Journal of Economic Theory, 5(2):267-277, 1972] correspondence by extending the methodology of Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24(3):217-237, 1995]. The paper first proposes a unified framework for the analysis of the relation between various aggregation problems and the social structure they induce, based on first-order predicate logic and model theory. Thereafter, aggregators satisfying Arrow-type rationality axioms are shown to be restricted reduced product constructions with respect to the filter of decisive coalitions; an oligarchic impossibility result follows. Under stronger assumptions, aggregators are restricted ultraproduct constructions, whence a generalized Kirman-Sondermann correspondence as well as a dictatorial impossiblity result follow.
Arrow-type preference aggregation Judgment aggregation Systematicity Model theory First-order predicate logic Filter Ultrafilter