Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHaake, Claus-Jochenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:47Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:47Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x366en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsupport resulten_US
dc.subject.keywordobject divisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarketen_US
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinsky solutionen_US
dc.titleTwo support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division marketsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn572499752en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
168.66 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.