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dc.contributor.authorHellmann, Timen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-26-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:23:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:23:41Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15973en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43816-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the context of diminishing marginal utility of own links. Second, it is shown that there always exists a pairwise stable network as long as the utility function of each player satisfies convexity in own links and strategic complements. For network societies with a profile of utility functions satisfying concavity in own links and strategic complements, a local uniqueness property of pairwise stable networks is derived. The results do neither require any specification on the utility function nor any other additional assumptions such as homogeneity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x423en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen
dc.subject.keywordNetwork formationen
dc.subject.keywordGame theoryen
dc.subject.keywordSupermodularityen
dc.subject.keywordIncreasing differencesen
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen
dc.subject.keywordExistenceen
dc.subject.keywordUniquenessen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwNutzenfunktionen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtsstabilitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleConvexity and complementarity in network formation: Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn616891741en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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