Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43816
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hellmann, Tim | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-26 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-24T10:23:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-01-24T10:23:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15973 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43816 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the context of diminishing marginal utility of own links. Second, it is shown that there always exists a pairwise stable network as long as the utility function of each player satisfies convexity in own links and strategic complements. For network societies with a profile of utility functions satisfying concavity in own links and strategic complements, a local uniqueness property of pairwise stable networks is derived. The results do neither require any specification on the utility function nor any other additional assumptions such as homogeneity. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefeld | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Papers |x423 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D85 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Networks | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Network formation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Game theory | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Supermodularity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Increasing differences | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Stability | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Existence | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Uniqueness | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziales Netzwerk | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nutzenfunktion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewichtsstabilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Convexity and complementarity in network formation: Implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 616891741 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.