Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43812
Authors: 
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Trockel, Walter
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 393
Abstract: 
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.
Subjects: 
Maskin monotonicity
Social choice rule
Bargaining games
Nash program
Mechanism
Implementation
JEL: 
C71
C78
D61
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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