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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 385
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a situation in which gains from cooperation are represented by a cooperative TU-game and a solution proposes a division of coalitional worths. In addition, asymmetries among players outside the game are captured by a vector of exogenous weights. If a solution measures players' payoffs inherent in the game, and a coalition has formed, then the question is how to measure players' overall payoffs in that coalition. For this we introduce the notion of a composite solution. We provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific composite solution, in which exogenous weights enter in a proportional fashion.
Schlagwörter: 
Composite solution
External weights
JEL: 
C71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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