Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43779
Authors: 
Farrokhi, Mahmoud
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 416
Abstract: 
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.
Subjects: 
Cooperative games
Coalition formation
Stable coalition
Shapley value
Airport Problem
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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