Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43773 
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dc.contributor.authorÇiftçi, Barışen
dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:27Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9969en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43773-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x384en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBanzhaf valueen
dc.subject.keywordHedonic gameen
dc.subject.keywordSemi-valueen
dc.subject.keywordShapley valueen
dc.subject.keywordSimple gameen
dc.subject.keywordStrict coreen
dc.titleStable coalition structures in simple games with veto control-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn572383118en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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