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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 384
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
Schlagwörter: 
Banzhaf value
Hedonic game
Semi-value
Shapley value
Simple game
Strict core
JEL: 
D72
C71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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