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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 413
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
We model and solve Best Choice Problems in the multiple prior framework: An ambiguity averse decision maker aims to choose the best among a fixed number of applicants that appear sequentially in a random order. The decision faces ambiguity about the probability that a candidate - a relatively top applicant - is actually best among all applicants. We show that our model covers the classical secretary problem, but also other interesting classes of problems. We provide a closed form solution of the problem for time-consistent priors using minimax backward induction. As in the classical case the derived stopping strategy is simple. Ambiguity can lead to substantial differences to the classical threshold rule.
Schlagwörter: 
Best choice problem
Secretary problem
Optimal stopping
Ambiguity
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Dokumentart: 
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