Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43767
Authors: 
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Klaus, Bettina
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 372
Abstract: 
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Subjects: 
Matching with Contracts
(Maskin) Monotonicity
Nash implementation
Stability
JEL: 
C62
C78
D78
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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