Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43759
Authors: 
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 375
Abstract: 
We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the 'most' stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Shapley value
Simple games
Winning coalitions
JEL: 
D72
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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