Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757 
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dc.contributor.authorLouge, Fernandoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:09Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-17302en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strategy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) have the desired convergence properties using an iterated dominance argument. For general games, however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that have a continuous support. We present a sufficient condition for convergence based on elimination of iteratively dominated strategies. This condition is more restrictive than CSS in general but equivalent in the case of strategic complementarities. Finally, we offer several economic applications of our results.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x436en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContinuously Stable Strategy (CSS)en
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionary stabilityen
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtsstabilitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the stability of CSS under the replicator dynamic-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640697194en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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