Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757
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dc.contributor.authorLouge, Fernandoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:09Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-17302en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strategy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) have the desired convergence properties using an iterated dominance argument. For general games, however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that have a continuous support. We present a sufficient condition for convergence based on elimination of iteratively dominated strategies. This condition is more restrictive than CSS in general but equivalent in the case of strategic complementarities. Finally, we offer several economic applications of our results.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW |cBielefelden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics |x436en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordContinuously Stable Strategy (CSS)en_US
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionary stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtsstabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the stability of CSS under the replicator dynamicen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640697194en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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