Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43757
Autoren: 
Louge, Fernando
Datum: 
2010
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers 436
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers a two-player game with a one-dimensional continuous strategy. We study the asymptotic stability of equilibria under the replicator dynamic when the support of the initial population is an interval. We find that, under strategic complementarities, Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS) have the desired convergence properties using an iterated dominance argument. For general games, however, CSS can be unstable even for populations that have a continuous support. We present a sufficient condition for convergence based on elimination of iteratively dominated strategies. This condition is more restrictive than CSS in general but equivalent in the case of strategic complementarities. Finally, we offer several economic applications of our results.
Schlagwörter: 
Continuously Stable Strategy (CSS)
Evolutionary stability
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

6



Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
389.76 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.