Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4372
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dc.contributor.authorPelikan, Pavelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:12:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:12:01Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/4372-
dc.description.abstractAs governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of marketcompetition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in PublicChoice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problemsrequire recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, andthat rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals andused for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which hasto rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only wayto produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism ofgovernment, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFreiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics |x07/2en_US
dc.subject.jelP51en_US
dc.subject.jelH10en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordunequally bounded rationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitics-as-selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choice , Beschränkte Rationalität , Theorieen_US
dc.titlePublic Choice with Unequally Rational Individualsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn534404324en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:aluord:072-

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