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|dc.contributor.author||Vanberg, Viktor J.||en_US|
|dc.description.abstract||Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become not only a growing subject in business schools and in academic as well as public discourse more generally, the CSR-movement has grown into a major industry providing a profitable niche for a variety of non-profit organizations. The literature devoted to CSR can fill libraries, and sorting out the variety ofarguments that academic researchers on, and political advocates of, corporate socialresponsibility have advanced is a Sisyphean task. The purpose of this paper is to identify andexamine some of the more fundamental arguments by approaching the matter from theperspective of constitutional economics.The focus of my analysis will be on the issue that Milton Friedman (1970) has raisedin a famous essay that has become a catalyst in the debate on CSR and by far the most oftenquoted paper in this debate. Restating an argument made earlier in his Capitalism andFreedom Friedman noted in this essay: "In a free-enterprise, private-property system acorporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibilityto his employers."||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aFreiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics |x06/6||en_US|
|dc.title||Corporate Social Responsibility and the "Game of Catallaxy": The Perspective of Constitutional Economics||en_US|
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