Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43667 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 11
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower copy prices which is beneficial for readers. Under certain circumstances, semi-collusion may even benefit advertisers as newspaper circulation is higher. In addition, total welfare may rise due to semi-collusion. Results under full collusion are ambiguous. However, even under full collusion newspaper copy prices may decrease and welfare may increase.
Schlagwörter: 
Media Markets
Collusion
Two-Sided Markets
JEL: 
L40
L82
D43
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-010-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
381.64 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.