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dc.contributor.authorDi Corato, Lucaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:44:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:44:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43576-
dc.description.abstractA government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment time trigger but only the feasible bargaining set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option value.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,5en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelK3en
dc.subject.jelF2en
dc.subject.jelO1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordReal Optionsen
dc.subject.keywordNash Bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordExpropriationen
dc.subject.keywordNatural Resourcesen
dc.subject.keywordForeign Direct Investmenten
dc.subject.stwRohstoffressourcenen
dc.subject.stwRohstoffwirtschaften
dc.subject.stwDirektinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwBergrechten
dc.subject.stwBergbaupolitiken
dc.subject.stwVerstaatlichungen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionsrisikoen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.titleProfit sharing under the threat of nationalization-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640183158en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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