Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43561
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
Pintassilgo, Pedro
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,79
Abstract: 
Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Third, we propose a transfer scheme that mitigates the possible negative effect of learning and which may even transform it into a positive effect.
Subjects: 
Transnational Cooperation
Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Uncertainty
Learning
JEL: 
C72
D62
D81
H41
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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