Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43544
Authors: 
Tirole, Jean
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 2010,78
Abstract: 
The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macro-prudential policies.
Subjects: 
Liquidity
Contagion
Bailouts
Regulation
JEL: 
E44
E52
G28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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