Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43525
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dc.contributor.authorBilland, Pascalen_US
dc.contributor.authorBravard, Christopheen_US
dc.contributor.authorChakrabarti, Subhadipen_US
dc.contributor.authorSarangi, Sudiptaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:43:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:43:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43525-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x2010,117en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordMultimarketen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen_US
dc.titleSpying in multi-market oligopoliesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640762778en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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