Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43475
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dc.contributor.authorKushnir, Alexeyen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43475-
dc.description.abstractSome labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has 'typical' commonly known preferences with probability close to one and 'atypical' idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism lessens the expected number of matches when signals are informative.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x2010,121en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelJ44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCheaptalken_US
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen_US
dc.titleHarmful signaling in matching marketsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640802680en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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