Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43470 
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dc.contributor.authorIkefuji, Masakoen
dc.contributor.authorItaya, Jun-ichien
dc.contributor.authorOkamura, Makotoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43470-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly firms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly firms affects the welfare of the home country. We characterize the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the fixed cost, depending on the degree of environmental damage from production. Finally, we show the existence of asymmetric equilibrium in which either firm chooses relocation of its plant even if the duopoly firms are identical ex ante.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,6en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEnvironmental policyen
dc.subject.keywordRelocationen
dc.subject.keywordWelfareen
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Standortwahlen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640183476en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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