Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443 
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dc.contributor.authorAgbaglah, Messanen
dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Larsen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-30-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:03Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443-
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2010,116en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOverlapping Coalitionsen
dc.subject.keywordCover Functionen
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordSymmetric Gameen
dc.subject.keywordNetworken
dc.titleOverlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640758088en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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