Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43413 
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dc.contributor.authorSantos Villagran, Rafael Joséen
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-05-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-16T15:55:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-16T15:55:14Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43413-
dc.language.isospaen
dc.publisher|aColegio de Economistas de A Coruña |cA Coruñaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomic Analysis Working Papers |x2007,13en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwKommunalwahlen
dc.subject.stwKommunale Finanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwBogotaen
dc.titleBogotá: El colapso de una maquinaria política-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn550986979en
dc.description.abstracttransIn Bogota reforms in 1991 blocked a market for buying and selling of votes. The patronage lost effectiveness, citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city demonstrated an outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and services. This story is illustrated by a new panel with data at the district and the polling station from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes preferences class of bogotanos by each of its mayors. However, the main result is the collapse caused by structural reforms. Before 1991, the most exposed areas to patronage generated a higher percentage of votes for the traditional parties and got more coverage in public services after 1991, the two relationships are no longer true. A patronage machine collapses.en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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