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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Parlane, Sarah | en |
dc.contributor.author | Rousseau, Fabrice | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-16T13:35:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-12-16T13:35:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We characterize optimal IPO design in the distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the after-market depresses the share's value to less informed investors. However, because it facilitates truthful interest report at the IPO stage it increases the expected offer price provided disadvantaged investors are sufficiently unlikely to flip their share. We compare the book-building's outcome to that of uniform price auction. The auction can enhance the expected offer price only if it systematically allocates a share to the strategic trader. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity College Dublin, UCD School of Economics |cDublin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series |xWP07/06 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G24 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G32 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Initial Public Offering | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Book-building | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Informed Trading | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Secondary Market and Dealer Market | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wertpapieremission | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Adverse Selection | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Optimal IPO design with informed trading | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 550448209 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200706 | en |
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