Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43319 
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dc.contributor.authorBargain, Olivieren
dc.contributor.authorDonni, Olivieren
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-16T13:35:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-16T13:35:04Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43319-
dc.description.abstractThere is a large empirical literature on policy measures targeted at children but surprisingly very little theoretical foundation to ground the debate on the optimality of the different instruments. In the present paper, we examine the merit of targeting children through two general policies, namely selective commodity taxation and cash transfer to family with children. We consider a household that comprises an adult and a child. The household behavior is described by the maximization of the adult's utility function, which depends on the child's welfare, subject to a budget constraint. The relative effects of a price subsidy and of a cash benefit on child welfare are then derived. In particular, it is shown that 'favorable' distortions from the price subsidies may allow to redistribute toward the child. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the State. Finally, it is shown that, in contrast to the traditional view, well-chosen subsidies can be more cost effective than cash transfers in alleviating child poverty.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity College Dublin, UCD School of Economics |cDublinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series |xWP07/03en
dc.subject.jelD13en
dc.subject.jelD31en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcommodity taxationen
dc.subject.keywordchild benefiten
dc.subject.keywordtargetingen
dc.subject.keywordintrahousehold distributionen
dc.subject.keywordsocial welfareen
dc.subject.keywordpaternalismen
dc.subject.keywordlabelingen
dc.subject.stwFamilienpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKinderen
dc.subject.stwFamilienleistungsausgleichen
dc.subject.stwSubventionen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA theory of child targeting-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn550442618en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ucn:wpaper:200703en

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