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dc.contributor.authorLaux, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06-
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-15T09:21:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-15T09:21:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43208-
dc.description.abstractThe paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aGoethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2008/54en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMultiline Insuranceen
dc.subject.keywordUmbrella Policiesen
dc.subject.keywordIntegrated Risk Managementen
dc.subject.keywordDeductible Insuranceen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensversicherungen
dc.subject.stwRisikomanagementen
dc.subject.stwBetriebswirtschaftliches Zielen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCorporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn606208402en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200854en

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